The European Union Fundamental Rights Agency has recently published report on “Access to data protection remedies in the EU Member States”. The report highlights the “victims’ lack of understanding and awareness about data protection and the authorities that serve to help them”.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has on 28 January 2014 delivered a land-marking judgment in the case of O’Keeffe v Ireland (n. 35810/09) concerning sexual abuses of children in Irish catholic schools in 1970s. It found that Ireland has violated article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and article 13 (right to an effective remedy).
168. To conclude, this is not a case which directly concerns the responsibility of LH, of a clerical Manager or Patron, of a parent or, indeed, of any other individual for the sexual abuse of the applicant in 1973. Rather, the application concerns the responsibility of a State. More precisely, it examines whether the respondent State ought to have been aware of the risk of sexual abuse of minors such as the applicant in National Schools at the relevant time and whether it adequately protected children, through its legal system, from such treatment.
The Court has found that it was an inherent positive obligation of government in the 1970s to protect children from ill-treatment. It was, moreover, an obligation of acute importance in a primary education context. That obligation was not fulfilled when the Irish State, which must be considered to have been aware of the sexual abuse of children by adults through, inter alia, its prosecution of such crimes at a significant rate, nevertheless continued to entrust the management of the primary education of the vast majority of young Irish children to non-State actors (National Schools), without putting in place any mechanism of effective State control against the risks of such abuse occurring. On the contrary, potential complainants were directed away from the State authorities and towards the non-State denominational Managers (paragraph 163 above). The consequences in the present case were the failure by the non-State Manager to act on prior complaints of sexual abuse by LH, the applicant’s later abuse by LH and, more broadly, the prolonged and serious sexual misconduct by LH against numerous other students in that same National School.
169. In such circumstances, the State must be considered to have failed to fulfil its positive obligation to protect the present applicant from the sexual abuse to which she was subjected in 1973 whilst a pupil in Dunderrow National School. There has therefore been a violation of her rights under Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection to the effect that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
The European Court of Human Rights has recently posted an excellent video on its youtube channel on how to correctly lodge an application with the Court. Well worth of checking it out !
Advocate General Cruz Villalon has on 12 December 2013 delivered his opinion in a higly controversial case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 on the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and that of Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. He concluded that said Directive;
is as a whole incompatible with Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since the limitations on the exercise of fundamental rights which that directive contains because of the obligation to retain data which it imposes are not accompanied by the necessary principles for governing the guarantees needed to regulate access to the data and their use (para. 159)
and added :
Article 6 of Directive 2006/24 is incompatible with Articles 7 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in that it requires Member States to ensure that the data specified in Article 5 of that directive are retained for a period whose upper limit is set at two years (para. 159).
The dilemma between protecting national security and the protection of fundamental rights of individuals to privacy does not fall between genuines dilemmas. It is actually not a dilemma. States can only protect national security in a manner that does not interfere unlawfully in the fundamental rights of individuals. Arbitrary interference of state and non-state bodies in the privacy of the individuals are illegal and in breach of the European Convention and the EU Charter.
An interesting conference will be held between 22 and 24 January in Brussels on data protection in the EU. The programme is available here.
Below are listed some of the articles, which have been published in past months on the European system of human rights protection.
Scott L. Greer, Tomislav Sokol, Rules for Rights: European Law, Health Care and Social Citizenship, European Law Journal (2014) Volume 20, Issue 1, 66–87.
Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.
Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an Emergent Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2013), 1056-1085.
The concept of “vulnerable groups” is gaining momentum in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has used it in cases concerning Roma, people with mental disabilities, people living with HIV and asylum seekers. Yet the appearance of the vulnerable group concept in the Court’s legal reasoning has so far escaped scholarly attention. Drawing on theoretical debates on vulnerability and equality as well as on the Court’s case law, this Article offers a descriptive and normative assessment of the concept. Reasoning in terms of vulnerable groups opens a number of possibilities, most notably, the opportunity to move closer to a more robust idea of equality. However, the concept also has some inherent difficulties. This Article argues for a reflective use of the concept and points out ways in which the Court can avoid its pitfalls.
Anthony Cullen, Steven Wheatley, The Human Rights of Individuals in De FactoRegimes under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review (2013)13 (4): 691-728.
The objective of this article is to evaluate the extent to which we can regard individuals in the territories of de facto regimes in the Council of Europe region (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transdniestria and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) as enjoying the protection of the European Convention on Human Rights. The work considers the utility of recognising ‘de facto regimes’ as subjects of international law, before examining the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights and wider international law on the human rights obligations of such political entities. It then draws on the doctrine of acquired human rights to recognise, in certain circumstances, that the European Convention on Human Rights can be opposable to such regimes and concludes by reflecting on the implications of the analysis for understanding human rights in world society.
Jernej Letnar Černič, The prohibition on hate speech in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Dignitas – Slovene Journal of Human Rights (2013), Issue 57-58, 128-145.
The right to freedom of expression is one of the foundations of a free, pluralistic, tolerant and democratic-minded society. However, the right to freedom of expression is not absolute because it must be protected in relation to other values. This article addresses and analyses 42 cases from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to hate speech. The analysis of these 42 cases illustrates the lowest common denominator, namely, that freedom of expression does not protect hate speech based on the glorification of genocide, crimes against humanity, the Holocaust or discriminatory and xenophobic statements against racial, religious or ethnic groups. The article concludes that individuals hold a key responsibility for creating a tolerant, open-minded and pluralistic public sphere in the respective European societies.
The European Court of Human Rights will on 23 January 2014 deliver an important judgment in case of W. v Slovenia (no.24124/06) on internal domestic remedial measures for violation of Article 6. Here is the summary :
The applicant, Ms W., is a Slovenian national who was born in 1971 and lives in Maribor (Slovenia). The case concerns criminal proceedings against a group of men who raped her in April 1990, when she was 18 years old. Charges of rape, aiding and abetting rape and sexual assault, respectively, were brought against ten men in September 1990. In November 1990 they were acquitted, based on the findings, in particular, that Ms W. had not seriously resisted sexual intercourse and that she had changed her testimony during the proceedings. On appeal, the second-instance court quashed the judgment in April 1991, finding that the facts had been insufficiently established, and remitted the case. Subsequently there were long delays in the proceedings, since two of the defendants had left the country and could not be found. After the proceedings against the two missing men had been severed into separate cases, six of the remaining defendants were convicted, of rape and aggravated rape respectively, and sentenced to imprisonment for between eight months and one year in a judgment of June 2002, eventually upheld by the Supreme Court in July 2007. The missing defendants were eventually found and extradited to Slovenia in 2003 and 2004 and they were convicted of aiding and abetting rape and of aggravated rape, respectively, and both sentenced to imprisonment of eight months by judgments which became final in August 2004 and June 2006. Relying, in substance, on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Ms W. complains in particular that the long delays in the criminal proceedings were in breach of the State’s obligation to effectively prosecute the criminal offences committed against her. While she was awarded compensation at national level for the distress she suffered as a result of the lengthy proceedings, she considers that the amount of 5,000 euros paid to her cannot be regarded assufficient redress.